Dependencia de las exportaciones y el cambio institucional en la negociación salarial en Alemania
Por: Raess, Damian.
Tipo de material: Artículo Tipo de portador: ImpresoTema(s): EXPORTACIONES | NEGOCIACION LABORAL | En: Thompson, William R., editor/a International studies quarterly Vol. 58, no. 2 (jun. 2014), p. 282-294Resumen: This article explores the adjustment of wage bargaining institutions to international trade in Germany. Embracing IPE as opposed to CPE lenses yields a novel interpretation of change in the institution of wage bargaining. Export dependence of a sector, we argue, has destabilizing effects for industry-wide bargaining by sparking an intra-sectoral cleavage between domestic- and export-oriented enterprises. Specifically, the greater the degree of export dependence of a sector, the greater the degree to which domestic-oriented enterprises within that sector will abandon collective bargaining. We also explain how workplace employee representation through works councils mitigates this effect, such that the presence of works councils helps domestically oriented firms to hold to collective bargaining agreements in the face of a sector's deepening exposure to export markets. These claims find empirical support in the history of labor relations developments in the metal industry and, especially, in extensive analysis of a cross-section of establishments. Our findings attribute major responsibility to the firms driving globalization for undermining collective bargaining institutions and suggest that economic globalization is a cause of dualization. In all, the article provides fresh ammunition for a version of globalization-induced institutional convergence. [Correction added after online publication on May 28, 2014: conversion changed to convergence in preceding sentence.]Tipo de ítem | Ubicación actual | Signatura | Info Vol | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras | Reserva de ítems |
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Publicación Periódica | Biblioteca UNTREF - Sede Posgrados | H327/QUA (Navegar estantería) | Vol. 58, no. 2 (jun. 2014) | Disponible | 2.007833 |
This article explores the adjustment of wage bargaining institutions to international trade in Germany. Embracing IPE as opposed to CPE lenses yields a novel interpretation of change in the institution of wage bargaining. Export dependence of a sector, we argue, has destabilizing effects for industry-wide bargaining by sparking an intra-sectoral cleavage between domestic- and export-oriented enterprises. Specifically, the greater the degree of export dependence of a sector, the greater the degree to which domestic-oriented enterprises within that sector will abandon collective bargaining. We also explain how workplace employee representation through works councils mitigates this effect, such that the presence of works councils helps domestically oriented firms to hold to collective bargaining agreements in the face of a sector's deepening exposure to export markets. These claims find empirical support in the history of labor relations developments in the metal industry and, especially, in extensive analysis of a cross-section of establishments. Our findings attribute major responsibility to the firms driving globalization for undermining collective bargaining institutions and suggest that economic globalization is a cause of dualization. In all, the article provides fresh ammunition for a version of globalization-induced institutional convergence. [Correction added after online publication on May 28, 2014: conversion changed to convergence in preceding sentence.]